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I. Introduction 
A. Purpose 
The purpose of this paper is to describe contemporary develop-
ments in genetics which have raised a variety of ethical problems. To 
do this, I will describe several of these developments , raise some of the 
thematic ethical issues to which they point, and describe some of the 
responses that have been made to them. I will look at two broad prob-
lem areas: the applicaton of specific knowledge in genetics and the 
implications of gaining such knowledge. My intent in discussing the 
ethical dimension of these problems is to provide an overview of the 
debates which are occurring with respect to these problem areas. Thus, 
I am more interested in presenting the contours of the debate rather 
than argue specific points, although that will also occur. It is also 
important to note that several of the problems I discuss are linked 
together. I will separate several of these primarily for purposes of dis-
cussion and analysis. 
B. Definitions 
Genetics is the division of the life sciences which focuses exclusively 
on the genes or the units that determine one's inheritance. Occasion-
ally in bioethical discussions, genetics is used as a shorthand way of 
referring to many of the disciplines and developments within the life 
sciences. Although I will occasionally use the word in this broad sense, 
I will primarily use it in the technical sense of the study of the genes 
and the application of that knowledge in a variety of settings. The 
genes are the basic blueprint or plan for heredity, the program wh ich 
helps specify how an organism will develop. The genes are made up of 
segments of DNA, deoxyribonucleic acid, in which four chemical 
subunits are united in a variety of ways. These four chemicals, 
abbreviated as A, G, C, T, are the alphabet which carries to the cell the 
instructions for making proteins. Within recent years, geneticists have 
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learned more and more about the composition of this alphabet, the 
processes by which t he message is originally written and communi-
cated, and the ways in which the messages can be read. Such growing 
understanding of the genetic code has occasioned many discussions of 
t he problem of both application and implication which find their way 
into this paper. 
The term genetic engineering has a similar narrow and broad mean-
ing. Strictly speaking, it refers to technical interventions into the 
structure of a gene for a variety of purposes including, but not limited 
to, removing a deleterious gene, changing the genetic structure of a 
particular organism, or enhancing a particular genetic capacity . 
Genetic engineering is an intervention into the actual genetic structure 
itself. In a broader sense, and in the sense most often used, genetic 
engineering refers to the possibility of designing not only our descend-
ants, but also of manipulating t he entire ecosystem in specific direc-
tions. More specifically, though, genetic engineering in the broad sense 
refers to technologies such as in vitro fertilization, cloning, recom-
binant DNA research, and a variety of other applications of the 
knowledge of genetics that has a social or policy dimension. 
II. Problems of Application 
A. The Technologies 
Recombinant DNA research is basically a technique by which a seg-
ment of DNA can be removed from its original strand and joined to 
another segment of DNA from a different organism, thus forming t he 
recombinant molecule. The new DNA that is placed into the host 
begins to replicate itself there. Thus, for example, a molecule can be 
made to produce insulin, a new species or organism could be devised, 
or a new pathogenetic agent could be made for use in insect control or 
biological-chemical warfare. 
Amniocentesis is a technique in which fetal cells are withdrawn 
from the amniotic fluid in the uterus by means of a needle inserted 
t hrough the pregnant wo man's abdomen. These fetal cells are then 
cu ltured, and the chrom osomes are screened to determine whether or 
not the developing embryo has a genetic anomaly. Several hundred 
genetic diseases can be diagnosed in utero, 1 plus the sex of the fetus 
and, given reasonable standards of quality contro l in the laboratory, 
amniocentesis is a highly reliable diagnostic technique. 
In vitro fert ilization and embryo transplant, or external human fer-
ti lization , received a great deal of attention last year when the first 
baby conceived , transplanted, and delivered by such a process was 
born in England. This technology involves the removal of an egg from 
t he ovary, external fertilization, and then implantation into a prepared 
uterus. While a fairly straightforward procedure, the success of this 
technique involves the interlocking of a variety of developments in an 
understanding of t he hormonal processes that contro l t he female 
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reproductive cycle, the development of a proper culture in which to 
have the fertilization occur, as well as the development of safe and 
reliable techniques for the removal of the egg and the transfer of the 
blastocyte. 
B. Ethical Issues 
1. Science and Society 
One issue is how science is perceived. Two important viewpoints are 
provided by contemporary commentators. Pope John Paul II, in his 
first encyclical letter, R edemptor Hominis,2 suggested that humans 
are becoming afraid of what they produce because of the perception 
that these products could radically turn against themselves. He 
emphasizes the growing fear that our products can become the means 
and instruments for self-destruction. Pope John Paul then asks why it 
is that this power has turned against humans and produced a state of 
disquiet, fear, and menace. Part of the answer he suggests comes from 
a shift in persons perceiving themselves not as masters or guardians of 
the world, but as its exploiters and destroyers. Coupled with this is the 
issue of determining whether or not those things which are produced 
make life more human and, therefore, more worthy of persons. 
Another perspective is presented by Daniel Callahan,3 who suggests 
that current developments in genetic engineering, broadly speaking, 
indicate that ho.th the scientific community and the general public are 
more prepared than ever to go ahead with new developments. Callahan 
indicates that there has been a typical reaction of wonder and excite-
ment in both the scientific and public media whenever a major break-
through has been discovered. He concludes that society continues to 
be attracted to scientific progress and technological applications of 
new insights into the processes of nature. Such a posture continues, 
Callahan suggests, because no generally persuasive argument against 
continued research and development in genetics has been developed. 
By this he means that there has been no argument that goes beyond 
logic to an emotional attractiveness that could impel people to act or 
not act. That is, none of the arguments against genetic engineering 
have been able to touch any of our cultural, ethical, or religious values 
in a way that is relevant to a critical evaluation of genetic engineering. 
Because of this, business has continued fairly much as usual and 
appears likely to do so for the foreseeable future. 
Another pro blem in the relation of science and society is a change 
in the way of doing science or in the model of scientific research. 4 
Traditionally, the purpose of science and a variety of other related dis-
ciplines has been to discover the truth of nature . The scientific quest 
was to understand what made things and organisms work. Research 
focused on discovering structures and stating general laws. Once this 
was done, the primary task of science was finished. 
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This model is changing, primarily because of discoveries in genetics 
as well as the application of a variety of other scientific principles, 
especially that of nuclear power. The new perception is that not only 
can we know the truths of nature, but we can also change nature. The 
discovery of the structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in the early 
1950's set in motion a chain of events which has led to the technique 
of recombinant DNA. It is now possible, as mentioned previously, to 
reconstruct various molecules and to make them perform in new ways. 
It is equally possible to build a new species out of previously existing 
species and, in this way, directly intervene in the evolutionary process. 
In addition to being able to state the basic scientific laws that regulate 
the workings of nature, it is also possible to intervene into the very 
heart of the genetic code to change the information and produce a 
new product. 
Such power, of course, raises a variety of issues related to the social 
implications of such a shift in model. One of the major areas in impact 
will be on the self-understanding of the scientist. Although the carica-
ture of the scientist sitting in the research laboratory unencumbered 
by any of the cares of the workaday world is manifestly inaccurate, 
nonetheless many scientists direct their primary efforts to basic 
research with little worry of potential applications or of long-term 
implications of what they were doing. It was assumed that they were 
apolitical and primarily providing a service which society would deter-
mine how to use. 
In the light of the new possibilities within science, however, such a 
posture may no longer be adequate. At least, a scientist must re-
examine what is the nature of the profession of science and what its 
relation to society might be. Callahan has suggested four general 
propositions which are helpful in such an initial re-evaluation. 
1. Individuals and groups are ordinari ly responsible only for the conse-
quences of those actions that are voluntary and intentional on their part . 
However, they may also be held responsible for the unintended con-
sequences of their actions if, through negligence, they fail to take into 
account such consequences. 
2. Individuals and groups cannot be held responsible for those actions the 
consequences of which are totally unknown . However, if they voluntarily 
undertake such acts, they may be held responsible for the consequences 
unless there were serious reasons for undertaking the action in the first 
place. One cannot, without serious reason, just " play around" in the 
unknown while simultaneously disclaiming responsibility for the results. 
3. When others may be affected by our actions, they ordinarily have a right 
to demand that the ir wishes and values be respected . This is particularly 
the case when those actions may result in harm to them. 
4. Individual scientists and scientific groups are subject to the same norms 
of ethical responsibility as those of all other individuals in groups in 
society. They have neither more responsibility for their actions nor less ; 
there is no special ethic of responsibility applying to scientists that does 
not apply to others. 5 
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Callahan then supplements these general propositions with two 
principles that he derives from the basis of our past experiences. The 
first of these is what he calls the historical principle which suggests 
that we know, in ways that earlier generations did not, that the search 
for knowledge can bring about harmful consequences and that it is 
possible to trace back the causal sequence. Because we know this is 
possible from past experience, Callahan argues that we should evaluate 
more carefully research that can set in motion causal chains, of which 
some outcomes might conceivably be harmful. This historical principle 
is supplemented with the imagination principle which suggests that a 
scientist might well assume that since unintended harmful conse-
quences have happened with other forms of research, he or she might 
assume that t he same thing could happen with this particular project. 
Therefore, it is incumbent on the scientist to try to project or to 
envision possibilities that may arise in the outcomes of the particular 
project so that they can be evaluated personally and socially. Such a 
framework, while not totally fail-safe, provides at least a context in 
which critical evaluation can occur before a project is started or when it 
appears that there may be harmful outcomes of a particular applica-
tion of knowledge from a project. Third, the past debate over the 
safety of recombinant DNA research and the growing debate over the 
safety of nuclear power has brought forth a new model of a scientist: 
the scientist as advocate . In these debates, we see different scientists 
hurling technical as well as personal accusations against one another. 
The problem that is revealed is the possibility that experts in a field 
can and do disagree on both the facts and the interpretation of those 
facts. The disagreement, however, allowed scientists to be perceived 
by the public and their peers as advocates for a particular position or 
cause. Many scientists realized that they were in a new role and were 
often uncomfortable with it; they also realized that many of the issues 
that they were discussing were socially important enough to justify 
such a shift in role. Of course, the model of the scientist as advocate 
presents an interesting problem about the relatio nship between facts 
and values. Oftentimes the facts may be reasonably clear and 
apparent, but the framework for the evaluation of these facts may be 
quite different between scientists for a variety of personal and social 
reasons. For example, one scientist may have a higher tolerance for 
risks than another, and this will color how he or she evaluates a partic-
ular problem. Thus, it is important for the scientist , when he or she 
assu mes the role of advocate, to recognize as clearly as possible the 
personal, scientifi c, social, and cultural sources of hi s or her viewpoint 
so that the advocacy can be on as reasonable a basis as possible. 
2. Nature and Ethics 
The secon d major area of discussion that is raised by some develop-
ments in genetics is the relationship between nature and ethics. One of 
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the traditional viewpoints in this discussion is to see nature as a type 
of limit. Traditional natural law theory is an example of this perspec-
tive. In this tradition, one uses the order of nature as the basis upon 
which one elucidates moral principles. This is justified because the 
order of nature reflects the plan of God for nature which can be dis-
covered and understood by human reason. Because this order of 
nature is normative, one can legitimately argue that nature in this per-
spective is a conservative or limiting principle because it sets up limits 
or bounds beyond which one may not go. As an example we can refer 
to the traditional argument against the use of artificial contraceptives 
which, in simplified form, states that they separate what nature 
united - sexual intercourse and procreation. Such a unity, it is argued, 
is inherent in the order of nature which reflects divine reason and, 
therefore, this structure limits what can be done in this area. Such a 
moral tradition tends to be conservative and would approach interven-
tions into nature with caution, if not suspicion. 
A second perspective envisions nature as a model. This orientation 
uses the natural law perspective mentioned above, to argue that some 
occurrences in nature might be replicated. While this model may not 
allow any more interventions into nature than the previously discussed 
model would, it could expand the kinds of things one could do on the 
basis of nature. In this framework, it might be legitimate to replicate 
certain instances of pre-moral evils that occur in nature as long as one 
has a proportionate reason for so doing. For example, it is the case 
that during the first several weeks of the process of conception and 
implantation and initial development approximately 70% of zygotes 
are lost. A number of these zygotes seem to be naturally aborted 
because of structural anomalies, hormonal imbalances within the 
uterus, or a variety of other problems connected with the necessity of 
many different systems coming together at precisely the right 
moment. Would it be legitimate, therefore, to replicate this instance of 
embryo loss in a laboratory during the course of efforts to fertilize 
human ova in vitro? A great number of research protocols could be 
justified in terms of the benefits both to future embryos and fetuses as 
well as the possibility of bringing benefits to those women who are 
unable to conceive in any other way. In this framework one would be 
replicating a natural phenomenon in the laboratory and justifying the 
pre-moral evil of embryonic loss on the basis of the benefits to be 
achieved by the research or the pregnancy, just as the high number of 
embryonic losses is justified in nature by the goods of family and 
children. 
Such an argument is put forward by Richard McCormick who limits 
its application to efforts to achieve a pregnancy. He says: "It is not a 
violation of the right to life of the zygote if it is spontaneously lost in 
normal sexual relations. Why is it any more so when this loss occurs as 
the result of an attempt to achieve pregnancy artificially?" 6 Karl 
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Rahner, basing his orientation on the doubtfulness of the personhood 
of the fertilized ovum, suggests that zygotes could be used as subjects 
of experimentation. "But it would be conceivable that, given a serious 
positive doubt about the human quality of the experimental material, 
the reasons in favor of experimenting might carry more weight, con-
sidered rationally, than the uncertain rights of a human being whose 
very existence is in doubt." 7 
This orientation is countered by Leon Kass. But although he takes a 
very strong stand against the use of embryos for research, he seems to 
allow the possibility of their use in research that leads to a pregnancy. 
Parenthetically , we should note that the natural occurrence of embryo and 
fetal loss and wastage does not necessarily or automatically justify all delib· 
erate, humanly caused destruction of fetal life. For example, the natural loss 
of embryos in early pregnancy cannot in itself be a warrant for deliberately 
aborting them or for invasively experimenting on them in vitro any more 
than stillbirths could be a justification for newborn infanticide. There are 
many things that happen naturally that we ought not to do deliberately . It 
is curious how the same people who deny the relevance of nature as a guide 
for re·evaluating human interventions into human generation, and who deny 
that the term "unnatural" carries any ethical weight, will themselves appeal 
to "nature's way" when it suits their purposes. Still, in this present matter, 
the closeness to natural procreation - the goal is the same, the embryonic 
loss is unavoidable and not desired, and the amount of loss is similar - leads 
me to believe that we do no more intentional or unjustified harm in the one 
case than in the other, and practice no disrespect. 8 
The third model of nature defines nature as evolving. The first two 
models of nature that I presented assume that nature is reasonably 
static and that the order that is present will remain . This third model 
sees nature as continually evolving. This does not necessarily imply 
that there is no stability to nature or no laws of nature that can be 
known. It does suggest, however, that such laws anc structures may 
not be as normative as the other models would su~gest and that a 
much greater degree of intervention may be possiblE . This view, for 
example, would see change and/or development as r ormative rather 
than exceptional. The working assumption of this mOl el is that things 
change, and that they change with respect to broadt r developments 
within the ecosystem as a whole. 
Within this model the concept of history takes on a significance 
lacking in the other two models. History here is seen as L near or teleo-
logical, rather than cyclic or episodic. History has a fut re~ and that 
future carries history forward. In Christianity, this orifntation con-
tains a dichotomy: the ultimate future transcends pers( ns and their 
efforts at self creation, but through their interventions in history and 
nature, persons open themselves to this future and help tc: achieve it. 
As Rahner says: 
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This human self-creation will develop the concrete form of human openness 
which leads to the absolute future that comes from God. But it is never 
capable by itself of bringing about this absolute future . Christianity, pre-
cisely because it is the religion of the absolute future, must simultaneously 
send man out to his duties in the World. 9 
Future developments are not entirely knowable or predictable. Yet, 
on the other hand, we know that we are evolving, and that we have an 
increasing capacity to determine various directions of evolution, 
induding human evolution. Thus, developments in genetics, as well as 
in psychology, psychiatry, and many of the behavioral sciences have 
made it possible to intervene in the development of human beings, and 
possibly into human nature, in a way never before thought possible. 
The previous two models suggested that nature may serve either as a 
limit or as a mirror of the kinds of interventions that might be 
ethically possible. Nature will not necessarily have such limiting 
capacities in an evolutionary model because the past will not neces-
sarily possess qualities necessary to insure survival in the future. The 
past is no longer normative, and the future assumes a greater role in 
defining efforts at self-creation. Such a possibility leaves us caught 
between the attempt to determine how much of our own self-percep-
tion and understanding of our nature is tied to our biology and placed 
within the ecosystem and history, and the perception that we possess 
the powers to change the course of the direction of evolution in 
accordance with our desires and preferences. In this model, a variety 
of interventions becomes possible and will be justified in terms of sur-
vival value, adaptability, and promotion of a model of human nature 
that is seen as desirable. 
3. Problems of Knowledge 
A third major problem area is that associated with problems of 
knowledge. We have all known the pains and anguish that come from 
knowing too little, especially about how to cure a particular disease 
that is killing an individual. Lack of knowledge often prevents us from 
solving a particular problem or developing a variety of strategies to 
provide for different contingencies. Limited knowledge has also made 
individuals hold on much too securely to that which is known, for fear 
that if that is questioned the foundations will be shaken and the uni-
verse will collapse. Limited knowledge can lead to a repression of 
knowledge, and we all know the terror that comes when the pursuit of 
knowledge is repressed. 
In our day we have the problem of seemingly too much knowledge. 
The information explosion has caused facts and the journals and 
books that report these facts to proliferate at a rate which makes it 
impossible for a responsible professional to keep track of new develop-
ments, even within a very narrowly defined area of knowledge. 
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Another problem associated with this information explosion relates to 
the qualitative dimension of that information. We are beginning to 
ask, and in many ways are being forced to ask, questions to which we 
really have neither a good answer nor a sense of how to go about 
answering. Our traditional sources of values are being strained to their 
limits by our technical capacities that follow from our gains in 
knowledge. A variety of disciplines including genetics, psychology, 
psychiatry, philosophy, and theology have all coalesced to raise ques-
tions about the meaning of the human. Until fairly recently most of us 
were reasonably satisfied that we had a workable sense of who we 
were and what we were about. New discoveries and insights into the 
full range of possible meanings of the human have given us a new 
burden in that we are no longer quite sure of who we are or what we 
are to be about. The culture in which we live certainly reinforces this 
questioning, but perversely casts us further adrift because it provides 
no common basis nor set of values which can help provide a founda-
tion on which to begin to construct a new answer to the question of 
what is a human being. 
In addition to these problems relating to knowledge, a third major 
issue is beginning to arise: discussions of the possibility of limiting or 
restricting research. Freedom of speech and freedom of thought are, 
of course, two of the most cherished values of our American culture 
and serve as significant ethical values in many theories of ethics. Any 
suggestion that knowledge be restrained faces a most difficult chal-
lenge. In fact, the presumption is that any restriction on knowledge or 
thought is almost inherently evil. Yet if one keeps in mind the shift in 
the model of nature from one of discovering the truth to that of 
changing nature, the argument may change somewhat. The knowledge 
that is in question here is knowledge of application or knowledge of 
implication. 
Few people argue that scientists should be restrained in thinking 
through a particular problem or speculating on a new theory. The 
traditional argument for this position is well stated by Key Dismukes: 
A major factor in advancing scientific understanding and correcting error is 
the opportunity of critics to challenge prevailing views and, if they can 
adduce convincing evidence, to modify an existing consensus. This aspect of 
science is more than a convenient and useful tradition. It is essential to the 
operation of science as freedom of speech is to the maintenance of 
democracy. 10 
The critical problem arises, however, when such knowledge is applied 
or is translated into action. Here the lines are not so cleanly drawn, 
although there is the tradition in American law, for example, of reli-
gious freedom's being limited to a freedom to believe whatever one 
wants, but not a similar freedom to act upon those beliefs. Some 
restrictions on actions are already- in place, such as regulations con-
cerning the participation of human subjects in biomedical and behav-
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ioral research and the regulations concerning the recombinant DNA 
technology . 
One background issue in this discussion is the value that progress 
has within our society.ll In many ways the knowledge explosion is a 
direct result of our valuing progress. The unstated or uncritical 
assumption is that progress is in and of itself valuable and, therefore, 
must be pursued. To achieve this goal, research and development are 
necessary and have a high priority. But it is legitimate at least to ques-
tion the value of progress and its role in our society, even though Gen-
eral Electric may continue to argue that it is our most important 
product. If progress is not morally necessary and perhaps optional, 
then it may be the case that a lot of what we perceive to be necessary 
may be interesting, but superfluous. This is not a direct argument 
against the concept and reality of progress itself; it is a suggestion that . 
mindless progress with an exponential generation of data may be 
inappropriate at this time. This is especially so in the light of diminish-
ing resources, especially money and energy. At a time when the total 
budget to be spent on scientific research and development is diminish-
ing, it may be appropriate to target certain areas of research as having 
priority because of their social necessity and value. In this light, limita-
tions on research and knowledge could come about, not because of 
inherent distrust of the knowledge to be gained or problems with its 
application, but rather because of the acceptance of a new system of 
social values and priorities. Greater care in the selection of research 
projects to fund would of necessity limit knowledge both quantita-
tively and qualitatively. 
Yet, as Daniel Callahan indicates, our society at present values both 
basic scientific research and applied scientific research. 12 Because of 
this cultural value, he argues that the burden of proof must lie with 
those who are opposed to research . He makes two exceptions to this 
basic rule. The first would arise in a case where serious potential harm 
to the general public can be hypothesized with a degree of probability 
greater than O. When that is the case, those who wish to pursue the 
research must submit the issue to public discussion and judgment. A 
second exception arises when there is a high probability that harm 
would result from the basic research which would be of a magnitude 
such as to pose serious threats to human welfare. In that instance, 
Callahan argues that the research should not go forward at all, even if 
it would be supported by the public. Such an orientation, building as 
it does on the current cultural status quo, is persuasive in its argument 
that the burden of proof rests with those who are opposed to research. 
Yet it does allow for the possibility of restricting research when there 
is a probability of harm and of prohibiting research when there would 
be serious harm to human welfare. Although not foolproof and con-
taining several ambiguities, such a position allows the discussion of 
this critical issue within our contemporary social framework. 
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In a recent article, David Smith suggests several reasons for restrict-
ing freedom of inquiry.I3 The first of these argues that knowledge 
may be immoral in its use and, therefore, restricted. This position 
would argue that the right to know must be less than absolute because 
some knowledge can end up doing more harm than good. While recog-
nizing the problems and limitations with this orientation, Smith thinks 
that it is important to think through what consequences the use of 
knowledge will have. He also suggests that knowledge that is either 
obtained or disseminated in an immoral way should be restricted. Here 
he argues that knowledge obtained at the expense of violating a per-
son's integrity or privacy is immoral and such attempts to gain 
knowledge by these means should be restricted. He also argues that 
knowledge which is disseminated in a way that is destructive of just 
cultural institutions or practices is immoral and should be restrained 
because it threatens the very fabric and basis of our life together. 
Finally , Smith suggests that knowledge which can be destructive of us 
as persons should be restricted. Some knowledge could shatter a per-
son's world view, and Smith argues that perhaps that knowledge 
should not be communicated to that person. He also suggests that pre-
mature communication of scientific theories could be immoral 
because they are untimely and, therefore, may also be harmful to a 
person's self-understanding. The basis of Smith's argument is his per-
ception that knowledge is social and must be evaluated in a social 
context, not in an exclusively individualistic framework . He also 
argues that a scholar or scientist has some responsibility for the reper-
cussions of speaking the truth and that therefore they should evaluate 
what they are saying, when they are saying it, and why they are saying 
it before they actually do say it. Thus, Smith concludes by arguing for 
a tradition of self-discipline hesitation rather than censorship or 
repression. 
III. Problems of Implication 
A. The Technologies 
One of the major spin-offs of our understanding of genetics has 
been the development of programs of genetic screening in which 
carriers of a variety of genetic diseases can be identified and informa-
tion given to them so they can make a more informed reproductive 
decision. Such screening programs involve an identification of a target 
population and an examination of the chromosomes of the individuals 
in that population to determine whether or not they contain deleter-
ious genes or structural or chemical anomalies. Then the information 
is given to the individual, and further genetic counseling can be 
obtained if desired. 
Another area that is of growing importance is genetic engineering in 
which a variety of therapies will be initiated by replacing or removing 
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deleterious genes from an individual so that a disease will not occur or 
will be corrected. The technology of recombinant DNA also makes it 
possible to envision the development of new species. Future develop-
ments offer the possibility of intervening directly into an individual's 
genetic structure for reasons of therapy or the achievement of per-
sonal or social desires. 
Another area of implication in genetics is really not a technology 
but an initial formulation of an academic discipline: sociobiology. 
This is the systematic study of the biological bases of all forms of 
social behavior in all kinds of organisms including humans. This new 
discipline is important because of the far-reaching questions it raises 
about the sources of various kinds of human behavior, especially 
altruism and freedom. The implications of such questioning of these 
valued forms of human behavior raise significant questions which need 
to be addressed at least in a preliminary fashion in a session such as 
this. 
B. Ethical Issues 
1. Definitions of Health 
One of the critical, thematic issues that is raised by both genetic 
screening programs and by genetic engineering is the question of what 
is health and what is disease. Such a discussion is extremely relevant 
because definitions of health and disease provide the baseline for a 
medical and ethical argument to determine whether or not interven-
tion is appropriate. One can argue, for example, that definitions of 
health and disease should be mainly physiological. 14 That is, one 
should view health as functional normality which looks to function 
according to design, to conformity and goals pursued by the organism, 
as well as the working out of the design of the organism. This orienta-
tion suggests that each structure or organ of the body has a particular 
range of activities and that if there is a deviation from that range, 
there is the possibility of a disease, and if that disease becomes dis-
abling, then it becomes an illness. This makes the task of diagnosis 
fairly simple. 
This perspective is being incorporated into an ethical argument by 
Paul Ramsey who proposes a medical indications policy.15 Here 
Ramsey argues that a decision to treat or not to treat should be made 
on the basis of physiological criteria which indicate whether the inter-
vention will benefit the patient or not. Such an ethical base line rests 
on a physiological definition of health and disease, as well as the pre-
sumption that such determinations can be made in a primarily value-
free context. 
A second orientation argues that definitions of health and disease, 
in addition to a physiological dimension, also contain a cultural or 
social component. This is especially true in the areas of psychology 
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and psychiatry, although it is also relevant to the evaluation of genetic 
diseases. For example, it is relatively easy to diagnose a broken arm 
and have little, if any, disagreement about the problem; the same is 
true about a variety of other illnesses. On the other hand, when one is 
attempting to determine whether one is deviant, crazy, or normal, the 
task is quite difficult and is open to a variety of interpretations based 
on both one's psychiatric theory as well as one's cultural and social 
values. While I accept and would argue that there certainly is such a 
reality as mental illness, I think it is imperative at the same time to 
recognize that there is a high component of both ideological biases 
and cultural values which influence how we perceive individuals whose 
behavior is seemingly outside the range of what is either accepted as 
normal or socially approved. 
Such theoretical issues have very practical implications, especially 
when dealing with genetic anomalies. For example, it is clear that 
Down's syndrome is heritable, although not in a traditional Mendelian 
calculus, and that individuals who have the syndrome suffer, among 
other things, a diminished capacity for abstract reasoning. There are 
physiological criteria by which one can diagnose the disease, and there 
are also psychological markers by which one can determine the degree 
of retardation. Yet, that is not the end of the story, for intelligence is 
highly valued within our society and that fact leads some to place the 
diagnosis of this syndrome into a different category. One who has this 
particular genetic disease is seen as a different kind of individual. He 
or she is one who does not merely have a disease; this individual is also 
socially impaired and disvalued. 
Others suggest that knowledge of an individual's genetic constitution 
may significantly alter how that individual is raised. For example, 
several individuals possess the XYY syndrome, which physiologically 
is simply the presence of an extra Y chromosome. One of the early 
suggestions in the literature about the social effects of this syndrome 
was that it was a possible predictor of aggressive or antisocial behavior. 
If parents were to learn that their child was affected with this syn-
drome and that there was the possibility of this syndrome causing 
antisocial behavior, could this not significantly alter how the parents 
raise the boy? Should the parents perceive this child as healthy or ill, 
diseased or well? Regardless of how one answers these questions, we 
have here an example of a genetic anomaly that has a clear physiolog-
ical criterion but an unclear social outcome with respect to its effect 
on the child. The way in which this boy will be raised may be in cul-
tural norms to evaluate his state of health. 
Another area of impact is the often unclear distinction between one 
who is a carrier of a disease and one who is afflicted with the disease. 
Being a carrier of a disease does not imply that one has the symptoms 
of the disease or is afflicted by the disease in any way. Genetic screen-
ing programs discover both those individuals who are carriers of 
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disease as well as those who are afflicted with it. If the distinction 
between such individuals is misunderstood or confused and communi-
cated in this fashion to others such as insurance companies, individuals 
who are only carriers of a disease could be prevented from receiving 
insurance policies or other health care benefits because it would be 
assumed that they were unhealthy. Not only are such individuals 
unjustly deprived of health care benefits, but they are unfairly labeled, 
and this provides a possible basis for discriminatory treatment. 
2. Perception of Self and One's Descendants 
A second problem involves the perception of one's self and one's 
descendants. The traditional ethical model in which personal responsi-
bility was exercised in relation to the earth and one's descendants was 
that of stewardship. This doctrine takes its point of departure from 
the creation narrative in the book of Genesis. As this doctrine was 
developed through the centuries, it was assumed that this stewardship 
was exercised in relation to the limits inherent in the orders of nature 
and society, both of which were presumed to be static and ordained 
by God. This model suggested that stewardship demanded both the 
maintaining of these limits and conformity to them. 
In the light of the influence of the theory of evolution and advances 
within the science of genetics, some are suggesting that a more proper 
description of human responsibility might be that of co-creator. 
Ironically enough, Robert Francoeur locates this perspective in the 
same biblical narrative. 
But it seems to me also that in our panic we have deliberately avoided one 
of the most basic premises of our Judeo·Christian tradition. We have always 
said, often without real belief, that we were and are created by God in his 
own image and likeness. " Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" 
logically means that man is by na ture a Creator or at least a co-creator in a 
very real, awesome manner. Not mere collaborator nor administrator, nor 
caretaker. By divine command we are Creators. Why, then, should we 
be shocked today to learn that we can now or soon will be able to create the 
man of the future? Why should we be horrified and denounce the scientist 
or physician for daring to "play God"? Is it because we have forgotten the 
Semitic (biblical) conception of creation as God's ongoing collaboration 
with man? Creation is our God-given role , and our task is the ongoing crea-
tion of the yet unfinished , still evolving nature of man. 16 
This orientation, while containing some overtones of a Promethean 
presumptuousness, suggests rather that humans now have the ability 
to enter into the process of evolution, to shape it, to direct it, and to 
redesign different life forms . As Karl Rahner notes: 
He no longer simply takes stock of himself, but changes himself; he contents 
himself neither with steering by his own history merely the alteration of his 
sphere of existence nor with the mere actualization of those possibilities 
which have always offered themselves to man in his commerce with his 
fellowmen both in peace and in war. The subject is becoming its own most 
proper object; man is becoming h is own creator. 17 
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The model of co-creator assumes that nature is dynamic and chang-
ing and that the end of the process is open, but related to the absolute 
future of humans. The exercise of responsibility in this model comes 
about from helping to shape and direct the evolutionary process 
according to values and criteria that are perceived to be appropriate in 
the light of goals that will promote human and social goods. Given this 
new stage of development as well as a new understanding of nature, 
the model of co-creator seems at least as appropriate as that of 
stewardship, if not more appropriate. 
Along with this debate on the model through which responsibility 
should be exercised, there is a continuing debate surrounding the 
whole understanding of personhood. The discussion centers on both 
indicators of humanhood as well as on qualities appropriate for human 
beings in the pursuit of their ends and goals . Joseph Fletcher made the 
initial contribution to the former debate by suggesting a variety of 
indicators of humanhood including criteria such as minimal intelli-
gence, self-awareness, self-control, a sense of time in the past and 
future, a capacity to relate to others, concern for others, communica-
tion, control of one 's own existence, curiosity, changeability, a 
balance between rationality and feeling, idiosyncracity, and neo-
cortical function .18 In a later article, Fletcher singled out neocortical 
function as the essential trait, the key to humanhood.19 This is 
because of the role of the neocortex in providing the biological sine 
qua non of all human activities. There were a variety of responses to 
Fletcher's original criteria which were more or less happy with them, 
depending on one's starting point. Nonetheless, in spite of the some-
what cavalier attitude with which they were proposed, Fletcher did 
provide a service by pointing to several problematic areas in defining a 
human being and stimulating debate on these problems. Even so, 
widely accepted criteria of indicators of humanhood would not neces-
sarily provide the total basis on which a determination of the value of 
a human being would rest. 
Another contribution towards the understanding of personhood, 
provided by Alasdair MacIntyre, 20 looks to desirable qualities rather 
than substantive criteria. MacIntyre establishes his criteria not by 
setting minimal standards by which one would be judged to be a per-
son or not, but by arguing for qualities that would be desirable in 
designing one's descendants. These include an ability to live with 
uncertainty, an understanding of one's past which provides a sense of 
identity, the ability to engage in non-manipulative relations, finding a 
vocation in one's work, accepting one's death, developing the virtue of 
hope, and a willingness to take up arms to defend one's way of life. 
These are very suggestive elements, important for understanding who 
persons are and how they relate to others, to society, and to nature. 
The first quality that MacIntyre suggests, the ability to live with 
uncertain ty, is a very critical virtue especially in light of the theory of 
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evolution. It had previously been thought, and was a deep psycholog-
ical consolation, that the orders of nature and society were stable and 
normative. They were perceived to be rooted in an unchanging order 
of the universe, established by its Creator. For better or worse, we 
know that this is not the case, and one of the realities with which we 
must make our peace is that our world is changing and will continue 
to change. Therefore, the ability to live with a lack of certainty is a 
highly desirable personal quality. MacIntyre very wisely, however, 
roots the quality of being able to face an uncertain future in a sense of 
identity that comes from a strong sense of the past, one's place in a 
family, in a neighborhood, and in a community. Knowledge of self 
and one's origins provides the strength needed to face an uncertain 
future. Two other of the qualities that he mentions are very impor-
tant. The first is the need to find meaning through one's work. There 
is a twofold suggestion here. One is that we need to find meaning in 
our lives, and one of the places where we can best find this is through 
the vocation that we have in the world. The other suggestion is that 
there are some things worth doing and it is important that they be 
done regardless of their consequences. The second element of impor-
tance is the virtue of hope which is a belief in a reality that transcends 
what is available as present evidence. The virtue of hope helps take us 
beyond a purely rational orientation to reality and provides us with a 
larger framework with which to both see and evaluate what we might 
be about as we face our uncertain future. 
Both of these orientations toward understanding the person suggest 
important issues. Fletcher, in his own way, emphasizes the role of 
rationality and planning in defining human qualities. In other writings, 
he has suggested that the more something conforms to rationality, the 
more human it becomes. For Fletcher, the use of genetic engineering, 
screening programs, amniocentesis, and the like in insuring the birth of 
a perfect child is more human because such processes make use of 
rational planning techniques. On the other hand, MacIntyre looks at 
broader qualities which appear to make persons more human. He 
suggests, by implication, a stance toward nature which presupposes 
the rational, but transcends it in a sense of both humility toward the 
future as well as a sense of hope that one can remain in control of the 
processes that will unfold before us. Both of these models have their 
strengths and weaknesses. They both point to significant dimensions 
of personal experience and the sense of the self, and they both suggest 
a variety of relationships toward nature which will be important in 
re-evaluating the two senses of responsibility toward the world 
described immediately above. In some respects, both of these orienta-
tions are departures from the traditional model of the person found in 
classical western philosophy and theology with its emphasis on a static 
nature within a static world. But they are both important because 
they suggest and allude to critical dimensions of the person which 
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were not fully taken into account by that classical tradition. Thus, 
they are extremely helpful in elucidating several qualities which it will 
be necessary to cultivate as we begin to redefine our place within the 
world. 
Another element in the perception of self is the articulation of 
one's relationship to one's descendants. This question, of course, 
looms large on the horizon because of our growing perception and 
experience of the scarcity of resources. It appears that we have already 
left our descendants an environment which is damaged and a world 
which has been depleted of many of its resources. This is not a very 
positive statement about ourselves and even less of one about our con-
cern for others. 
Certainly our descendants, . whoever they may be, will have a 
number of interests similar to ours. The problem is trying to define 
the basis on which those interests should be respected, if at all. 
Although utilitarian and contract models may not provide totally sat-
isfactory resolutions of the problem, both suggest that one should at 
least look toward the future when calculating total utility or when 
trying to define how to act justly. Another approach would suggest 
that we know that our descendants will need certain basic goods to 
survive and that, therefore, they are entitled to these as a matter of 
human rights. The orientation here focuses on not harming future gen-
erations, rather than promoting their well-being. Both of these 
approaches might suggest that we should leave our descendants at least 
as well off as we are, for in doing so we respect their interests and 
leave them the resources necessary for an adequate quality of life. 
My orientation toward this problem will also be affected by how I 
see myself in relationship to other human beings. If, for example, I see 
myself as a solitary individual with few links to my neighbors and my 
community, then the whole question of responsibility to others has a 
less significant place in my ethical considerations. If, however, I see 
myself in a community which has come from other communities and 
which is producing future communities, then it is more likely that I 
will be concerned with the environment that I hand on to my 
immediate descendants. These moral connections form the basis for 
evaluating my actions in the light of my needs as well as those of my 
descendants. 
Another framework for analyzing this problem comes from one's 
orientation toward the end of the world . If one adopts a more 
apocalyptic viewpoint, then the question of future · generations 
becomes somewhat less critical because when the end comes, it will 
come quickly and reality will cease to have significance. The 
apocalyptic orientation suggests that life may not be as teleological as 
we would hope and that while all of us may have goals and aspirations 
we wish to see fulfilled, ultimately the world ends and we end with it. 
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On the other hand, if one has an eschatological viewpoint which sees 
the future as the source of goals and values, then one can see oneself 
as building toward a reality that will come to fruition in the absolute 
future . In this framework it is important to build for one 's descend-
ants a world which can be lived in and be a continuing source of hope. 
If one views the future through the apocalyptic lens, the question of 
the future is not that important because the end of the world is the 
end of significance. In the eschatological framework, however, what 
goes on within history and culture is important and relates to the 
absolute future that will, eventually, be reached. In this framework, 
the relationship to one's descendants is important and must be eval-
uated much more carefully. 
3. Biology and Behavior 
A third important element is the relationship between our biolog-
ical structure and our behavior. Such issues, although traditional in 
their origins, have received a tremendous revival from the growing 
perspective of sociobiology and the sophisticated knowledge we have 
of genetics. 
The concept of altruistic love, expressed as either giving one's life 
for another or in being one 's brother's or sister's keeper, has formed 
one of the major pillars of the western ethical tradition. One of the 
suggestions of sociobiology is that perhaps such a high exercise of 
altruism is not entirely voluntary and therefore not a moral act on the 
part of an individual. Rather, such behavior may be programmed into 
us by our genes, and our altruism is simply a mechanism of biological 
survival rather than an important moral virtue. J. B. Haldane, a British 
biologist, suggested the genetic structure of such altruistic behavior 
when he proposed that he would lay down his life for two brothers or 
eight cousins. The reason for that formulation was that it took that 
many of each group to achieve a genetic identity to his which would 
make his own sacrifice genetically acceptable, i.e., insured that the 
same number of similar genes would remain in the gene pool. The 
basic implication of such a posture is that one is altruistic towards 
those who are genetically similar to me because even if I do not 
benefit myself, I do aid those who have genes similar to mine. 
Therefore, from a biological point of view, it makes no difference 
whether I survive or they survive, because the same genes will survive 
and be present in the gene pool to replicate themselves. 
In the framework of E. O. Wilson, one of the contemporary 
founders of sociobiology, egoistic behavior is behavior which guaran-
tees that the genes will in fact cause copies of themselves to exist; 
altruistic behavior is behavior which insures that copies of genes con-
tained in an organism will survive, although they may be contained in 
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another organism. These biological definitions of egoism and altruism 
are then used interchangeably with the ethical concepts of selfish and 
unselfish. The problem is that a direct translation appears to be rather 
difficult. On the one hand, behaviors we experience as selfish or 
unselfish are usually conscious and the result of an evaluation of con-
sequences. A strategy for a genetic replication is typically unconscious 
and therefore not under our control. Also the way the words egoism 
and altruism are used refers primarily to actions which affect the gene 
pool. One could infer that actions having no significant impact on the 
gene pool must be neither egoistic or altruistic or, in value terms, 
selfish or unselfish. That, however, does not correspond to our exper-
ience. Therefore, we must be aware of such an easy and uncritical 
translation of biological categories into ethical categories. 21 
Even though Wilson may not have the desired translation of genetic 
terms into ethical terms, Arthur Caplan argues that there is a point at 
which such verifications of biological behavior would be relevant to 
ethical theory. He illustrates this by his discussion of psychological 
egoism and ethical egoism. The theory of psychological egoism is a 
factual theory about human motivation which claims that everyone 
al ways tries to act in his or her best interest. If such a factual theory 
were true, Caplan argues that the only reasonable basis for justified 
ethical behavior would be a theory of ethical egoism which defines 
morality as a matter of self interest. The only acceptable and meaning-
ful ethical principle, therefore, is always to act to promote your own 
individual good as much as possible. A significant part of the argument 
for this position would be to determine that genes both actually cause 
specific behaviors and that they are the sole causal agent for them. In 
addition to the empiral data that a person would have to gather to 
prove this position, one would also need to accept a great deal of 
reductionistic theory which has its own theoretical problems. 22 
Sociobiology also becomes involved in discussions of freedom and 
moral responsibility, as has already been suggested in the discussion of 
altruism. Part of the problem in this discussion involves the clarifica-
tion of the concepts of freedom and determinism. If by freedom is 
meant a radical freedom in which the person is bound by no con-
straints whatsoever, then it is clear that sociobiology as well as tradi-
tional philosophy and theology would be able to mount a strong case 
against such a concept. On the other hand, if one accepts a more 
modest theory of freedom in which choices are possible but only 
within certain perimeters, then sociobiology may not be able to argue 
as strongly against this as some of its proponents may suggest. 
The discussion of freedom must also be related to a discussion of 
determinism. Again, two extremes can be posed. Hard determinism 
holds a theory of universal causation which argues that for every 
effect and event there is a cause and that by definition freedom is 
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incompatible with this perception of reality. From a sociobiological 
viewpoint, this could mean that each of us is genetically determined 
and, therefore, subject to irresistible compulsions and coercions and 
must do what our biology tells us to do. Self-determinism would also 
hold a theory of universal causation, but suggests that some causes 
originate with human beings and that freedom is compatible with 
determinism; this is a theory of self-determinism. From a biological 
perspective, it could be argued that each of us has a set of predisposi-
tions within us which can cause us to move in some directions rather 
than in others, but that no one specific action is totally determined. 
A theory of hard determinism rules out a sense of both freedom 
and moral responsibility. If one cannot control one's actions and if 
one is simply acting in a preplanned manner, one cannot be respon-
sible for one's actions. On the other hand, it does seem necessary to be 
able to trace a certain chain of causality in one's actions so as to assign 
responsibility for them. If one cannot argue back to a variety of 
factors which caused one to act in a certain way, one could similarly 
argue that the individual is not responsible. Human behavior cannot 
simply be reduced to a set of biological coordinates. Such reduction-
ism is contrary to our conscious experience and does not take into 
account all of the behaviors which we attribute to free choice and for 
which we assume people are morally accountable. In this perspective, 
moral responsibility and freedom are argued for in terms of the causal 
efficacy of human intentions and volitions in relationship to genetic 
and environmental factors. Such a theory focuses on self-determina-
tion rather than genetic determination. It attempts to subsume into 
itself a variety of data from different perspectives arguing, however, 
that the self is the reality which is ultimately responsible for what is 
done and assumes that responsibility can be justified on the basis of a 
variety of causalities operating at different related levels . 
The final topic in this section deals with the setting of social 
policies based on some concept of justice or equality. Although a 
variety of meanings may be read into these concepts, they have func-
tioned as primary values in American society and as the basis upon 
which many policy decisions have been made. For example, the belief 
that all persons are created equal is the cornerstone of the American 
way of life. Yet over the past several decades many allegations have 
been made about genetic differences between people which would 
seem to challenge these values. There are claims, for example, that 
intelligence is related to one's racial group, or that aggressive behavior 
is related to the presence of an extra Y chromosome. Such claims, it is 
assumed, would make a significant difference with respect to the 
social treatment of individuals within these populations. 
It needs to be said immediately that a particular social policy does 
not necessarily follow from a set of empirical facts, whatever they 
may be. The fact that an individual may belong to a particular group 
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which actually has less genetic potential with respect to a certain level 
of achievement has no necessary relationship to the specific policy 
that is directed to that group. Thus, for example, a policy could be 
articulated which would argue that these individuals need more pro-
tection because they have less potential; on the other hand, a policy 
could also be formulated which states that because these people have 
less potential, they should simply be ignored. 
What would be important, though, is that if it would be the case 
that certain individuals have a particular genetic potential or lack of a 
potential, that fact, when it is established as a fact, should be taken 
into account in policy-making so that realistic policies and goals can 
be set. This is simply saying that we should not try to do, much less 
legislate or mandate, what we are not capable of doing, whether this 
be biological or psychological. It is both inappropriate and unjust to 
devise programs to help individuals reach potentials which they are 
utterly incapable of achieving. On the other hand, the fact that they 
might be incapable of reaching a certain potential does not mean that 
they should be discriminated against, rejected by the society, or in 
other ways ignored in terms of sharing in the basic goods of that 
society. Facts need to be taken into account in setting policy, but 
social and cultural values mediate those facts as they are incorporated 
into policy, and genetics does not provide a totally adequate basis for 
such a social evaluation. 
Sociobiology and other research in genetics does suggest that there 
may be problems ahead for those who have assumed that the concept 
of equality of persons means equality in all respects. It is quite clear 
that people are biologically different and therefore have a vast amount 
of different potentials, and that the potential of each person is shaped 
by his or her genetic background as well as the environment in which 
he or she is raised. The fact that people are unequal with respect to 
their potential does not mean that they are unequal with respect to 
their moral value as individuals and as persons. Such an evaluation of 
equality is independent of biological and environmental differences. 
Sociobiology and other research in genetics could provide a useful 
service by providing information about individuals who may have 
limited potential so that unreasonable accomplishments would not be 
expected from them. This could protect these individuals from having 
unreasonable demands made of them and help eliminate some degree 
of frustration from their lives. However, the determination of such d if-
ferences does not and should not jeopardize the unique moral value of 
these individuals as persons. 
IV. Conclusion 
Recent developments in genetics have provided an opportunity to 
review and re-examine many traditional and thematic principles and 
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concepts in ethics. I have included several of these topics and shown 
how this new knowledge can help reformulate a concept or challenge a 
traditional orientation. New discoveries in genetics as well as other 
areas of the life sciences will continue, and new applications and 
implications of that knowledge will occur. I hope that this presenta-
tion has provided a framework for examining these problems as well as 
suggested some helpful directions in thinking about the resolution of 
these new ethical dilemmas. 
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